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"Let's Call It a Draw":
Striker Replacements and the Mackay Doctrine
LEONARD BIERMAN*
RAFAEL GELY**
The issue of striker replacements has divided the labor law academia. In
this Article, ProfessorsBierman and Gely respondto a criticism of theirprior
proposal to shift the initial entitlement to striker replacements from the
employer to the union, while requiring the union to bargain in goodfaith over
the striker replacement issue. Professors Bierman and Gely describe their
initialproposal,illustrate the criticisms that have been made of it, and respond
to those criticisms.

I. INTRODUCTION

In a recent article' we discuss the issue of the use of permanent
replacements for striking employees under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). 2 Our discussion focuses on the efficiency aspects of the seminal 1938
case of NRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.3 In the article, we propose a
"negotiations" approach, which we argue is likely to result in a more
economically efficient interpretation of the Mackay doctrine.

As has been the case with other proposals made with respect to this very
contentious issue, 4 our proposal has confronted some criticism. Professor
William R. Corbett, in a recent piece in the Ohio State Law Journal,5 has
* Professor,

Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University.

** Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, and
NegotiationsApproach, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 363 (1995).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988).
3 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
4 See generally Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 U. ILL. L. R~v. 817
(1941) (arguing that employers have an obligation to bargain with strikers, yet they have an
incentive to hire striker replacements); Charles B. Craver, The NationalLabor Relations Act
Must Be Revised to PreserveIndustrialDemocracy, 34 Apdz. L. REv. 397 (1992) (advocating
for modifications to the Mackay doctrine, within the context of broader labor law reform);
Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 LAB. L.J. 287 (1987) (describing the
striker replacement doctrine as a troubled area of American labor law); Matthew W. Finkin,
Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 547 (1990)
(advocating for the outright overruling of Mackay); Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall,
IndustrialRelations in Transition:The PaperIndustry Example, 102 YALE LJ. 1803 (1993)
(suggesting that labor law and industrial relations policy reinforce management's growing
bargaining advantage over unions).
5 See William R. Corbett, Taking the Employer's Gun and BargainingAbout Returning
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attacked our proposal as "theoretically unsound" and unlikely to work in
practice. 6 In this Article, we reply to Professor Corbett's criticism. In Part II,
we briefly restate our initial proposal. In Part III, we present Professor
Corbett's argument and respond to the criticisms he levies against our proposal.
In Part IV, we discuss what we believe is the major flaw in Professor Corbett's
attack, i.e., a misunderstanding of the labor relations process and its

implications for the development of public policy with respect to the striker
replacement issue.

II. OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL

A. The CurrentApproach
For almost sixty years, the legal rights of striking employees and their
employers have been in large measure defined by the U.S. Supreme Court's
1938 Mackay Radio decision. 7 In Mackay, the Court interpreted the NLRA to
generally permit employers to hire permanent replacements for striking workers

engaged in economic strikes. 8 The Mackay decision has been interpreted to

allow employers broad authority to permanently replace economic strikers, and
consequently gives little protection to many striking employees with regard to
their jobs. 9 The Mackay doctrine, however, has been limited in several
respects.10 First, the Court has limited the terms of employment that firms can

offer striker replacements. 11 Second, once the strike is over and the strikers
have indicated an unconditional desire to be reinstated, the employer must
It: A Reply to "A Law, Economics, and Negotiations Approach" to Striker Replacement Law,
56 OmIo ST. L.J. 1511 (1995) [hereinafter Taking the Employer's Gun]. Professor Corbett
himself has also contributed to the ever growing literature on the issue of striker replacements
with an interesting, yet misguided, proposal which focuses on procedural aspects of the
Mackay doctrine. See William R. Corbett, A Proposalfor ProceduralLimitations on Hiring
Permanent Striker Replacements: "A Far,Far Better Thing" than the Workplace Fairness
Act, 72 N.C. L. REv. 813 (1994) [hereinafter ProceduralProposal].
6 See Taking the Employer's Gun, supra note 5, at 1520. "
7 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
8 See id. at 345.
9 See Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contractand the Prospectsfor
Union Representation, 98 HAv. L. REv. 351 (1984) (discussing the uneven and unfair
manner "in which the NLRA interferes with employees' exercise of economic freedom
during a labor dispute").
10 See Bierman & Gely, supranote 1, at 368-70.
n See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (holding that employers
cannot, in order to attract replacement workers, offer these replacements superseniority or
higher rates of pay than that received by the strikers).
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reinstate the strikers to the same or substantially similar jobs as soon as
openings occur. 12 Finally, the Court has directly limited the use of Mackay as
an anti-union device by requiring employers to have clear proof that newly
hired replacement workers oppose union representation before being able to
assume that there is a "good faith doubt" as to the desire for union
representation on the part of these workers. 13

B. The Problem
Our analysis of the striker replacement issue starts from the proposition that
a major drawback of the current legal standard is its failure to minimize
"opportunistic behavior" between employers and unions. 14 We note that
providing employers with the blanket right to hire permanent replacements for
economic strikers, as the Mackay rule does, makes it difficult to differentiate
between those situations where the employer really needs to hire such workers
in order to continue operations and those cases where the employer is engaging
in arguably opportunistic behavior. 15 Overturning the Mackay rule without
more, however, will create a situation in which unions would possess complete
protection against the hiring of permanent replacements, and thus might
themselves have an incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior. 16
Our interpretation of the problem that the Mackay doctrine creates is based
on what we believe is a critical distinction in the striker replacement debate: the
level of firm-specific investments the workers involved in the strike have
made.17 While this distinction is central to our proposal, it appears that
Professor Corbett has overlooked or failed to understand its importance.
In our article, we assert that to understand the dynamics of the striker
replacement issue we must first understand the economics of the employment
relationship within which the parties interact. We argue that the unionized
working environment can be better understood from the perspective of Internal
Labor Markets (ILMs). ILMs refer to the type of employment arrangement in
which there is a need for workers to develop skills that are idiosyncratic to the
particular firm and thus not easily transferable within the industry (i.e., firmspecific skills). 18 Without some form of an expectation or commitment to a
12 See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); see also NLRB v.

Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969).
13 See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
14 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 1, at 370.
15 See id. at 371-74.
16 See id.

17 See id.
18 See Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collecave
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long-term employment relationship, it is likely that neither workers nor
employers will be willing to "invest" in the acquisition of these firm-specific
skills. 19 ILMs refer to the set of explicit or implicit agreements wherein the
investments made by the parties in training and other firm-specific skills are
protected.20 Thus, a special, internalized employment relationship between the
21
employer and employee is established.
By internalizing the employment relationship, firms can encourage workers
to make long-term investments in the firm. Employees may invest early in their
careers by agreeing to a below-market wage rate while learning the skills
required to perform a job. 22 Employees recover a return on their investment at
a later point in their careers-when their actual wage is higher than what they
could make outside the firm.23 Similarly, employers invest at the earlier stages
of the employee's career by paying a wage that is higher than that employee's
marginal productivity. 24 The employer recovers her investment during the
employee's midcareer years. At that stage, the employee's marginal
productivity is believed to exceed the wage paid by the employer. 25
While, at first glance, ILMs appear to solve the problems associated with
the acquisition of firm-specific skills, they create a different and potentially
more significant kind of problem. Specific skills are in a sense sunk
investments.26 Once these investments have been made, a bilateral-monopoly
bargaining arrangement is created and is ripe for strategic or opportunistic
behavior.27 "Opportunistic" behavior occurs when one party attempts to breach
the ILMs arrangement by trying to "expropriate" the returns the other party
expects from its investments. 28 The incentives for the employer to comply with
the implicit contract are significantly reduced once the employer has recouped
her investment.2 9 Thus, if the employer terminates the employment relationship
with its employees after the employees have learned the firm-specific skill and
Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial
Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1353 (1988).
19 See id.
at 1361.
20 See id. at 1357-58.
21 See id.
22 See

Bierman & Gely, supra note 1, at 372; see also Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle
Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 8, 12-19
(1993) (providing alternative interpretations of the ILMs model).
23 See Bierman & Gely,supra note 1, at 372-74.
24
See id.
25 See id.
26 See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 1360.
27 See id.
2 8 See id.
29 See id. at 1361-64.
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the employer has recovered its investment, but before the employees are able to
recover their investments, the employees' investments will be lost. 30 Similarly,
employers' investments could be lost if, during the midcareer years, employees
make it more difficult for employers to recover their investments by engaging
in behavior such as shirking, withholding information, and otherwise increasing
31
monitoring costs.

Collective bargaining agreements provide a solution to the problem of
enforcing ILMs. 32 By explicitly incorporating various aspects of the

employment relationship (i.e., rules governing working hours, promotion
opportunities, and grievance procedures), enforcement mechanisms, and
provisions making the agreement contingent on such future events as changes in
the finn's product market or changes in the macro-economy, collective

bargaining agreements attempt to control opportunistic behavior. 33

Within this framework, the issue of striker replacements can easily be
understood as an opportunistic behavior problem. The employer's ability to
permanently replace economic strikers permits the employer to "force" the
union to strike, 34 and then use the permanent replacement right to replace those
30 See id.
31 See id.
32
See George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law
and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK UNrvERSrry 43RD ANNuAL
NAiOiNAL CONFEREN cE ON LABOR 109, 115-16 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990); see also Michael
L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, in THE
ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 86-108 (Daniel J.B. itchell & Mahimood

A. Zaidi eds., 1990) (discussing how seniority and other sorts of tenure provisions protect
workers from the potential opportunistic behavior of firms that have recouped their
investments and who would be willing to fire older workers).
33 See Wachter & Wright, supra note 32, at 86-108. Human resource management
policies in nomnnion firms serve the same purpose. For example, seniority provisions are not
unique to the union firms. In academia, where the vast majority of employees lack union
representation, tenure provisions are commonly used. The use of tenmre provisions in
academia nicely fits the ILMs model. Younger professors may invest time serving on
idiosyncratic university committees and engage in other firm-specific endeavors with the
assurance that, once they become tenured, the university cannot simply fire them later in their
careers, when they happen to be less professionally active. See generally RICHARD P. CHArr
& ANDREw T. FORD, BEYOND TRADYnONAL TENuRE (1982) (examining the changes taking
place in the traditional concept of tenure); BARDwEm.. L. SMr, TBE TENURE DEBATE (1973)

(explaining the different perspectives in the debate over tenure).
34 Te NLRA imposes on the employer and the union a duty to bargain in good faith. 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3)(d) (1988). 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) defines the scope of this duty:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
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employees that are in the recouping stage of the ILMs process. 35 The current
law on striker replacements, we argue, fails to provide any mechanisms to
constrain such kinds of behavior by employers. Neither the post-Mackay
cases 36 nor the constraints imposed by the labor market 37 are sufficient to
eliminate the kind of opportunistic behavior that arises out of the dynamics of
the internal labor market.
On the other hand, we also note in our article that reversing Mackay, and
in that way shifting the initial entitlement over the striker replacement issue,
without more, might result in a situation in which unions can in turn engage in
opportunistic behavior against the employer. 38 Under the internal labor market
model, employees that have received firm-specific training can expropriate the

employer's rents by engaging in behavior, such as withholding their job effort,
that increases labor costs to the firm and thus reduces the firm's profitability. If
unions are allowed to strike, knowing that their members cannot be
permanently replaced, they will be free to engage in strikes and in that way
39
expropriate rents due to the employer.
C. Our Solution
Our proposal is thus based on the principle that the basic problem with
respect to the right of employers to permanently replace economic strikers is
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
Thus, while the parties must bargain in good faith, there is no requirement that the parties
reach an agreement. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960)
(discussing the implications of the duty to bargain in good faith).
35 See Bierman & Cely, supra note 1, at 374-78.
36
As discussed above, in the six decades after the Mackay ruling the Supreme Court and
the NLRB have decided various cases which arguably attempt to limit the ability of employers
to abuse their Mackay rights. We argue that current case law fails to provide an adequate
constraint on the kind of opportunistic behavior described above. See id.
37
Professors Wachter and Cohen argue that the external labor market will also serve as
a check on employer opportunistic behavior. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 18, at 1353.
In our initial article, we argue that the labor market's constraints are generally insufficient to
limit employer's opportunistic behavior. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 1, at 375-76.
38 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 1, at 384-88.
39
In our article, we illustrate the operation of the theory of ILMs and its relationship to
the striker replacement issue with the example provided by the flight attendants' strike in the
fall of 1993 at American Airlines. We argue that the flight attendants' strike illustrates the
ineffectiveness of the Mackay doctrine and its progeny in deterring opportunistic behavior by
both employers and unions. See id. at 380-83.
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the need to prevent the kind of opportunistic behavior created by the dynamics
of internal labor markets. A critical distinction in our proposal is that it is
addressing the issue of striker replacements within the context of ILMs, a
context which arises primarily in cases where there is a need for firms to
motivate employees to acquire firm-specific skills.
The solution we propose involves (1)providing unions and striking workers
with protection against permanent replacement by changing the initial legal
right, and (2) making the striker replacement issue a mandatory subject of
bargaining. 4° By providing this protection, we will make it more costly for
employers to force a strike in the hope of getting rid of the union. The
employer will only be able to accomplish this by paying a fairly high price:
closing operations. 41 By making it a mandatory subject of bargaining, we limit
the union's ability to behave opportmistically. Unions will have to make
explicit tradeoffs between job security issues and other bargaining demands.
The union could then exchange the protection against permanent replacements
for other bargaining demands it might value more highly. 42
IH. PROFESSOR CoRBETr's RESPONSE

A. The Allegory
In his characteristic hyperbolic style, 43 Professor Corbett begins his reply
with an allegorical rendering of our proposal. 44 In Corbett's rendition, the
town's sheriff, just before a gunfight between "Employer" and "Union" is
about to start, interferes, and asks Employer to hand over his gun. 45 In
disbelief, Employer points to Union and pleads to the Sheriff to also take away
Union's gun. The Sheriff refuses and explains to Employer that although Union
will keep his gun, he will not shoot Employer. Instead, "[Employer] and Union
are going to sit down and bargain about whether Union will give it back to
you. "'46
Employer grudgingly accepts after the Sheriff explains to him that for
40 See id. at 384-88.

41 In Textile Workers Union of America v. DarlingtonMfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965),
the Supreme Court held that a complete shutdown of a business, even if solely motivated to
escape a union organizing effort, would not violate the employer's duties under the NLRA.
42
See Bierman & Gely, supranote 1, at 388.
43 See ProceduralProposal, supra note 5, at 815-26 (describing a tale of two labor
battles); see also Taking the Employer's Gun, supra note 5, at 1516-19 (describing the
confrontation between an employer and a union as a western movie type gun fight).
44 See Taking the Employer's Gun, supranote 5, at 1516-19.
45 See id.at 1517.
46 Id.
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47
the right price Union will certainly give back the gun to Employer.
Corbett continues his allegory by describing what happens once bargaining
starts. He describes how Union, any time a disagreement arises in negotiations,
"[r]eaches down and taps his fingers on the gun protruding from his holster,"
and how Employer nervously retreats and asks Union to calm down. 48 Corbett
also describes how Union's proposals to Employer, to the extent that Union will
allow Employer to "shoot" some but not other of Union's people, are angrily
opposed by those likely to be affected. 49 The story ends with Union laughing at
a powerless Employer's threats, Employer reaching for another weapon-"[a]
knife perhaps"-being shot by Union, and while wounded, reluctantly agreeing
50
to Union's demands to save himself.

B. Mano a Mano: The Criticismand OurResponse
1. Overview
From this entertaining, yet distorting, rendition of the striker replacement
problem, Corbett goes on to identify what he feels are the flaws in our
proposal. Corbett's argument is threefold. First, Corbett argues that our
proposal is incomplete in that it fails to recognize that Mackay is but one part of
the current law regulating striker replacements. Second, according to Corbett,
our proposal fails to make a case as to why we should change the default rule
(i.e., shifting the legal entitlement from the employer to the union). Contrary to
our argument, Professor Corbett believes that under our proposal unions will be
unlikely to bargain over the striker replacement issue, making it likely in turn
for them to behave opportunistically. Finally, Corbett criticizes our proposal in
terms of its practical implications.
2. Round One: Failingto Recognize Other
Limitations Under CurrentLaw
Professor Corbett's first criticism of our proposal is our alleged failure to
"recognize or appreciate" that the law concerning striker replacements involves
much more than just the Mackay doctrine. 51 Corbett recognizes that a main
theoretical concern of our proposal was to respond to prior arguments 52 that the
47

See id.

48 Id. at 1518.
49

See id.
id. at 1519.

50 See

51 See id. at 1520-23.

52 See Cohen & Wachter, supranote 32, at 118.
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external labor market limits opportunistic behavior by employers in this area
because employers will find it difficult to hire permanent replacements at
below-market wages, and because replacements will be reluctant to make firmspecific investments in firms that develop a reputation for behaving
opportunistically. 53 However, Corbett argues that we failed to recognize that
the U.S. Supreme Court and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have
imposed several constraints on the ability of employers to behave
opportunistically. 54 These constraints, argues Corbett, are likely to result in
efficient outcomes, without having to make the changes we proposed in our
article. 55 In particular, Professor Corbett argues that cases like NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp.,56 NLRB v. Fleetwood TrailerCo.,57 NLRB v. Laidlaw Corp.,58
and NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. 59 serve as major impediments to
the ability of employers to behave opportunistically.
Our response to Corbett on this point is twofold. First, we did recognize
that the Mackay doctrine has been limited in several respects. In particular, we
identified the four cases cited by Corbett as potential constraints. 60 Second,
however, we argued that these cases do not represent real constraints on the
kind of opportunistic behavior that arises from the dynamics of the internal
labor market. 61 Consider, for example, the Erie Resistor decision. 62 Under Erie
Resistor, the employer is prohibited from offering superseniority to striker
replacements as an incentive to cross the picket line. 63 The Erie Resistor rule,
under Corbett's analysis, represents a constraint on employer's opportunistic
behavior, since it prevents the employer from offering replacements better
conditions than those offered to strikers.6a Our argument is that employers can
circumvent Mackay without having to offer replacements any greater benefits
than what currently is being offered to the union. We argued that during a
strike an employer can in theory attract enough workers by offering them
slightly more than what their best alternative will be, even if this is slightly less
than the union's final demand. 65
53

See Taking the Eniployers Gun, supra note 5, at 1520.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 1521.
56 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
57 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
58 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969).

59
494 U.S. 775 (1990).
60 See Bierman
& Gely, supra note 1, at 368-69.
61 See id. at 374-78.

62 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
63 See id. at 235-36.
64 See Taking the Employer's Gun, supra note 5, at 1521.
65 See Bierman
& Gely, supranote 1, at 375-76.

HeinOnline -- 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1011 1997-1998

1012

OHIO STATE IAW JOURIAL

[V/ol. 58:1003

Next, Professor Corbett points out that there exist other constraints on the
employer's ability to behave opportunistically. In particular, Professor Corbett
notes that under our model, the employees that are in theory more likely to be
subject to opportunistic behavior are the kind of employees that the employer
will be less likely to terminate. 66 In particular, Professor Corbett points out that
the employees that are in a vulnerable position are those that have invested in
firm-specific skills. 67 The fact that these employees possess these firm-specific
skills, argues Corbett, should be enough deterrent to an employer's incentive to
behave opportunistically, since "they are the employees that the employer
would have the most difficulty replacing because the replacements must be
68
trained, and that training involves both cost and time."
From the perspective of ILMs theory, the answer to Corbett's criticism lies
basically in issues of timing. As Corbett correctly points out, there are strong
incentives for an employer not to terminate employees who have made firmspecific investments. However, Corbett fails to realize that while the incentives
to not behave opportunistically are strong during the middle years of the
employees' careers (when their productivity exceeds their wages), they are
substantially reduced at later years in the employees' careers, when their wages
exceed their productivity. 69 For example, a university may have little incentive
to replace a 40-year-old striking university professor, 70 who is an active
researcher and who participates fully in the affairs of the school by means of
extensive committee work (i.e., a professor who has made firm-specific
investments). However, the university's administration might well, absent
tenure protection, permanently replace a striking 68-year-old professor who is
no longer an active researcher, even though the latter has made substantial
investments in firm-specific skills (i.e., has also engaged in a substantial amount
of administrative and committee work). The tenure system thus protects the
professor's earlier firm-specific investments.
In general, though, ILMs present the key problem of how to reduce
opportunistic behavior during the periods when there are no internal constraints
that minimize the ability of the parties to the ILMs contracts to behave
opportunistically. Contrary to Professor Corbett's argument, neither the cases
66

See Taking the Employer's Gun, supra note 5, at 1522-23.

67 See id.
68

Id. at 1522.

69 See Schwab, supra note 22, at 15-19.
70 Under the NLRA, university and college professors are not considered "employees,"
and thus are not covered under the protections afforded to employees under the Act. NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). Various state statutes, however, allow university and
college professors to organize and bargain collectively with their employers. See, e.g., Higher
Education Employer-Employee Relations Act, CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 3562 (West 1995).
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refining the Mackay doctrine nor the dynamics of ILMs provide such a
mechanism.
3. Round Two: Failingto Explain Why the
Default Rule Should Be Changed
Having faulted our interpretation of the current state of the law concerning
striker replacements, Professor Corbett not surprisingly goes on to criticize the
proposal we advance to solve what we argue is the main problem with the
current law on striker replacements. 71 As discussed above, 72 our proposal
involves, first, providing unions and striking workers with protection against
permanent replacement by changing the initial legal right. By providing this
protection, we will make it more costly for the employers to force a strike in
the hope of getting rid of a union. Second, we propose that the striker
replacement issue be made a mandatory subject of bargaining. The second step
is necessary in order to minimize union opportunistic behavior.
Professor Corbett first asserts that, contrary to our argument, unions will
not be likely to bargain over the striker replacement issue. 73 In the context of
the likelihood of unions to call strikes, Corbett recognizes that strikes are not
cost-free for employees: striking employees do forego their regular paychecks,
and any harm imposed on the employer ultimately harms the employees who
are dependent on the employer for their financial well-being. 74 According to
Corbett, however, neither of these two factors is sufficient to prevent unions'
reliance on the strike weapon. 75 Corbett first points out that strikes do indeed
occur. 76 This is evidence that the hardship of strikes on employees is not
enough of a constraint to prevent unions' reliance on strikes. By further
reducing the costs associated with engaging in a strike, our proposal, according
to Corbett, will likely fuel more strike activity. 77 Second, argues Corbett,
unions do not need to engage in a strike to reap the benefits of strike activity. 78
The "strike threat," especially under a paradigm in which employers cannot
permanently replace economic strikers, should be sufficient to force excessive
demands on employers. 79 Finally, since employers and unions have access to
71 See Taking the Employers Gun, supra note 5, at 1525-35.
72 See supranotes 40-42 and accompanying text.
73 See Taking the Employer's Gun, supra note 5, at 1525.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 1526-27.
76 See id.
77 See id.

78 See id.
79 See id.
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different information, and since both parties are likely to evaluate information
differently, it is unlikely that the financial well-being of the employer will be a
sufficient deterrent to the opportunistic use of the strike weapon by unions. 8° In
particular, Corbett argues that "some employees may be concerned with the
financial stability and competitiveness of the employer only in the short term,
after which their own financial well-being may no longer depend on the
employer."81

In response to Professor Corbett's first two arguments, it can be argued that
exactly the opposite is now true under current law. That is, by allowing
employers to hire permanent replacements, the current law reduces employer
costs of forcing the union to engage in a strike. Further, Mackay not only
reduces the costs of a strike, but also, and more dramatically, increases the
potential benefits of a strike to an employer. For an employer who wishes to
behave opportunistically by trying to use the strike and the concomitant hiring
of permanent replacements to eviscerate the union, the Mackay doctrine is
paramount. Thus, while our proposal arguably reduces the costs to the union of
engaging in a strike, Mackay has a similar effect on employers' costs, plus an
additional positive effect on their benefits. Holding other things constant, the
current law on striker replacements should have a greater effect on the
likelihood of strike activity.
In addition, Professor Corbett argues that we are wrong in suggesting that
because the employee's future economic well-being depends on the employer,
unions will be reluctant to make excessive demands that could have a
detrimental long-term effect on the employer. 82 Professor Corbett argues that
employees will be more concerned with the financial stability of the employer
only in the short-term, but not thereafter.8 3 This argument is interesting for
several reasons. First, it is paradoxical that Professor Corbett uses the shortterm vs. long-term dichotomy against employees. If there is one lesson that
recent developments in financial markets have taught us, it is the propensity of
U.S. companies to capitalize on short-term profits for the benefits of
shareholders to the detriment of almost all other "stakeholders." 84 Second,
Professor Corbett's criticism completely misses the dynamics of the ILMs
model. What characterizes ILMs is the long-term nature of the employment
relationships. Employees who have made firm-specific investments, and who
are past the mid-years of their career, will be particularly concerned with the
80 See id.
81 Id.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See Shareholders Values, THE ECONOMST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 15-16 (describing

different models of corporate behavior).
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future economic viability of the firm. 85 This is true because the external market
86
opportunities for such employees at other firms are likely to be quite limited.
Professor Corbett's next argument attacks our assertion that under current
law there is not a proper set of incentives to permit the parties to negotiate over
the striker replacement issue. Corbett raises several points in this respect. First,
he questions why there have not to date been any significant attempts to
negotiate provisions shifting the default right.8 7 Even if transaction costs were
high in general, argues Professor Corbett, we should have seen at least a few
instances where the parties have negotiated such provisions. 88 An initial
response to Corbett's argument, which still does not in any way concede to his
broader criticism, is that in fact a few similar provisions have indeed been
negotiated, even if on a more limited scale. For example, the following two
provisions have been agreed to in collective bargaining contracts to guarantee
the continuing operation of critical operations, even during the course of a
contentious strike:
Mhe Employees as well as the Union shall cross all picket lines for the
performance of work which is essential to the maintenance of the Company's
plant and equipment for standby operations. 9
No strike or lockout shall occur at the establishment covered by this Agreement
during the life of this Agreement, and continuous kilns shall be maintained at
all times at a temperature which will result in no loss of ware or damage to the
kilns, and periodic kilns under fire shall be burned off. Pumping operations
shall also be continued during any strike or work stoppage that may occur as
stated above. 9°
Although not conclusive evidence, the lack of similar provisions in other
collective bargaining agreements is at least an indication that there might be
bargaining impediments which make it more difficult for the parties to achieve
85

See Schwab, supra note 22, at 24-28; see also Olivia S. Mitchell, Pensions and Older
Workers, in THE OLDER WoxIca 151, 156 (Michael E. Borus et al. eds., 1988) (discussing
the effect of pension arrangements in motivating employees to focus on the long-term time
horizon of the firm).
86

See id.
87 See Taking the Employer's Gun, supranote 5, at 1527-28.
88 See id.
89

Collective bargaining agreement between Olin Corporation and the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) No.
1281, at 77:376 (July 7, 1994).
90 Collective bargaining agreement between Harbison-Walker Refractors and the
Steelworkers, 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) No. 1281, at 77:377 (July 7,

1994).
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such results. Making the striker replacement issue a mandatory subject of
bargaining would remove one such impediment.
Corbett then goes on to argue that we failed to provide any support for our
conclusion that the initial entitlement should be shifted to the union. Corbett
characterizes our proposal as resting on the proposition that the only reason to
argue for the shifting of the initial legal entitlement over the right to hire
permanent replacements to the union is that unions tend to value the right
concerning the hiring of permanent replacements more highly than
employers. 91 Corbett argues that we provide no support for such a rationale,
and goes on to provide an alternative rationale which, he argues, demonstrates
92
that any shift in the initial allocation of rights is unwarranted.
In particular, Professor Corbett argues that a better approach to
determining the allocation of the initial entitlement is to focus on the transaction
costs of a particular proposal. 93 According to Corbett, our proposal will likely
increase transaction costs, and thus make it less likely that the parties would
successfully negotiate a solution to the striker replacement conflict. Corbett first
points out that all issues in collective bargaining agreements are normally
negotiated at the same time (i.e., in batches) 94 and not discretely issue by issue.
This makes it difficult for unions to explain to their members what they got in
exchange for the rights they bargained away. Therefore, unions that have an
initial entitlement may refuse to bargain it away. 95 Second, Corbett argues that
because of the tendency of employees to value more highly an entitlement that
initially belongs to them, as compared to an entitlement that initially belongs to
the employer, unions will "charge employers more to purchase the entitlement
than unions would pay employers for that entitlement." 96 Consequently,
concludes Corbett, unions' valuation of the initial entitlement will be
exaggerated in the collective bargaining context, making it less likely that the
parties will reach an agreement on the striker replacement question. 97
In addition to the tendency of unions to exaggerate the valuation of their
initial entitlement, Professor Corbett argues that there exist several factors that
make it unlikely that unions will ever agree to bargain away their right
prohibiting the use of permanent strikers. For example, argues Corbett, because
91 See Taking the Employer's Gun, supranote 5, at 1528.
92 See id. at 1529.
93 See id.
94

See DOUGLAS L. LEsLIm, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND

POLICY 426-27 (3d ed. 1992) (providing a law and economics analysis of the collective
bargaining process).
95

96

See Taking the Employer's Gun, supra note 5, at 1531.

Id. at 1532.
97 See id.
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of the difficulties in assessing the preferences of members with respect to
whether or not to bargain away the striker replacement right, union leaders will
find it "politically expedient" to not bargain over the striker replacement
issue. 98 Similarly, by bargaining away this right, unions will be less willing to
strike, since they will have reduced bargaining power vis-A-vis the employer. 99
Bargaining away the protection against the use of striker replacements has
implications not only for the current set of negotiations, but for future
negotiations as well. One of those implications is that unions will enter future
negotiations in a weaker bargaining position. 100 As a result, concludes Corbett,
unions will be unwilling to bargain the right away in the first place.
While Professor Corbett criticizes our analysis as incomplete and naive, his
argument against the shifting of the initial entitlement to unions is even more
unpersuasive. The problems that he identified as likely to cause unions to
exaggerate the valuation of the initial entitlement, and that will likely result in
unions being unwilling to negotiate away this right, seem equally applicable to
employers within the collective bargaining process.' 01 Similar to union leaders,
these negotiators will have to make assessments concerning what they believe to
be the preferences of their principals. Except for the possible "numbers"
differentials (i.e., union leaders might be trying to assess the preferences of
hundreds or thousands of employees, while management officials usually have a
smaller number of principals), Professor Corbett fails to provide any evidence
that the problems he identified are in fact unique to union negotiators. 102
Professor Corbett thus provides no rationale for why the default rule should
favor the employer. He merely identifies the various valuation problems that
any negotiator worth her salt will have to overcome.
Even conceding that unions confront those problems, that in itself is not a
sufficient reason to argue against the shifting of the initial entitlement. While
union leaders might have to confront such valuation problems, that is exactly
what they are elected to do. To the extent that members care about an issueand arguably the issue of striker replacements is important enough to command
the employees' attention-leaders should be expected to be quite responsive to
the preferences of their members.103 To say that union leaders are likely to be
98 See id.
99 See id. at 1532-33.

100 See id.
101 See THOMAS A. KOcHAN & HARRY C. KAiz, CoLLEcvE BARGAnG AND

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONs: FROM THEORY TO PouCY & PRACTICE 201-07 (1988) (describing
the problems faced by management in preparation for collective negotiations).

102 See id. at 201-05.
103
See ROBERT J. FLANAGAN

ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

470 (1989) (describing the politics of internal union structure).
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responsive to the preferences of members on these issues does not mean that
unions will always negotiate away the right to hire permanent replacements.
Obviously, that will depend on all the other circumstances surrounding a
particular set of negotiations. Professor Corbett argues that because of the
future implications negotiating away the striker replacement rights will have on
unions, they will be very unlikely to engage in such an exchange. By giving up
their legal right against being permanently replaced, unions will be giving up
"future leverage for a collective bargaining agreement in the present." 104 It is
inconsistent for Professor Corbett to argue that by shifting the right to unions,
unions will be more likely to strike, while at the same time arguing that if the
entitlement is shifted and bargained over unions will never strike again. More
fundamentally, however, Professor Corbett misinterprets the implications of our
proposal and assumes that unions will behave in a way which is not supported
by recent developments in collective bargaining.
Clearly, under our proposal, unions will have to make a tradeoff between
the benefits to be derived from a current collective bargaining agreement and
the position that such a tradeoff leaves them in for future negotiations. That,
basically, is the essence of collective bargaining. Whenever unions negotiate for
higher wages, changes in work rules, or the inclusion of a grievance arbitration
process in a contract, they have to be cognizant that they are paying a price for
the benefits they get.' 05 Moreover, sometimes the price unions pay will not be
realized until later. Unions appear to be quite good at making those tradeoffs,
as evidenced, for example, by the era of concession bargaining during the
1980s. 10 6 Unions during the 1980s negotiated contracts that resulted in
tremendous concessions to management, the impact of which was felt not only
during the terms of the contracts, but also for years after the agreements
expired.107
Obviously, not all unions at every single negotiation will trade off a right
such as the protection against permanent replacements. Nevertheless, some
unions will do so some of the time. This is the nature of the collective
bargaining process. Those that do-and Professor Corbett is correct in this
regard-will indeed be giving up some leverage for future negotiations. If they
make such a tradeoff, unwise as Professor Corbett feels that decision will be, it
will be their decision and they will have to confront its future consequences. It
has been a tenet of American labor policy to not second guess the parties'
10

4 Taking the Employer's Gun, supra note 5, at 1532-33.
105 See FLANAGAN Er AL., supranote 103, at 540-46.
106

See id.; see also THOMAS A. KocHAN Er AL., THE TRANsFORMATiONS OF

AMMuCAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

109-21 (1986) (discussing the era of concession

bargaining and providing an analytical framework to understand the causes of that period).

107 See id.
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agreement.10 8 This is what collective bargainingis all about.
4. Round Three: Not Worthwhile in Practice
Professor Corbett takes a parting shot at our proposal from a more practical
as opposed to theoretical perspective. He argues that unions will not adopt the
bargaining strategy that derives from our proposal due to the political
implications of such a strategy.1°9 Professor Corbett correctly points out that
our proposal is based on the distinction between employees with firm-specific
skills and those with more general skills. Arguably, those employees with firmspecific skills are the ones that are likely to be subject to employer opportunistic
behavior, due to the idiosyncrasies of their training. In deciding whether and
how to protect employees with finn-specific skills, unions might have to make
tradeoffs with negative implications for other employees. In this sense, argues
Corbett, the bargaining strategy that derives from our proposal is in conflict
with the self-preservation interests of unions. 110 Corbett goes further, arguing
that even if such conflict is not enough to prevent unions from making
tradeoffs, unions, as a matter of principle, should not adopt such a strategy. 111
In particular, argues Corbett, "[t]o differentiate among employees regarding
sale of the right to permanently replace would be extremely divisive, splintering
the bargaining unit and setting it at war against itself.,112
Professor Corbett's final criticism of our proposal evidences the same flaws
as his earlier criticisms. In particular, Corbett, without any empirical evidence,
assumes that the self-preservation concerns of a union will always dominate any
other concerns or interests the union might be seeking to protect; thus,
negotiation over the striker replacement issue will be unlikely. As Corbett
suggests, some unions will be unwilling, because of internal political reasons, to
negotiate provisions that have a disparate impact on various segments of their
membership, even if permitted by law to do so. However, based on prior
collective bargaining history, other unions may well adopt such a strategy.
Seniority provisions 1 3 and two-tier wage systems114 are but two examples of
108

See Leo Troy, Will a More Interventionist NLRA Revive Organized Labor?, 13
HARv.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y. 583 (1990). See generally Getman & Marshall, supra note 4, at

1807-08 (discussing the traditional collective bargaining model of industrial relations).
109 See Taking the Employer's Gun, supra note 5, at 1534.
110 See id.

111 See id.
at 1535.
112Id.
113

See FLANAGAN Er AL., supra note 103, at 525 (describing the use of seniority

provisions as a mechanism in the allocation of benefits).

114 Under two-tier agreements, newly hired employees are permanently subject to a
lower wage schedule than current employees. See id. at 507; see also Bierman & Gely, supra
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provisions that are frequently negotiated into labor agreements, and which have
a disparate impact on various groups within the union. 115 Unlike Professor
Corbett, we stop short of arguing that every union will, under all
circumstances, negotiate away the right prohibiting permanent replacements.
Some will do so, while others will not. While we do not know the answer to
that, we believe there is strong prior evidence that such a result could occur.
Under our proposal, it will be left up to the collective bargaining process.

C. last One Standing
In the previous section we attempted to answer in detail Professor Corbett's
criticisms of our initial proposal. In summary, however, we want to focus not
on any particular component of our reply, but instead on what appears to be the
general misunderstanding that Professor Corbett has of our proposal.
Professor Corbett appears to believe that both unions and employers are in
similar positions with respect to their ability to behave opportunistically. His
allegorical rendition of a gunfight between "Union" and "Employer," both of
them wanting to have the gun and both willing and eager to kill the adversary,
makes that much clear. In Professor Corbett's view, whoever happens to have
the initial entitlement (i.e., the gun) will be able to behave opportunistically.
Moreover, it appears that in Professor Corbett's view unions are more likely
than employers to behave opportunistically. His allegory is notably lacking in
any reference to the history of the two gunfighters. Except for suggesting that
there has been some "bloodshed" in the past, Corbett's allegory does not
inform us about the background of the rivals. Has the bloodshed been mainly
caused by Employer? Has Employer in the past used the gun to make
outrageous demands from Union? The impression the reader gets from
Corbett's allegory is that one gunfighter, Employer, will always use his gun
appropriately, perhaps because of legal constraints (Erie Resistor, etc.), while
the other gunfighter, Union, cannot be trusted and will, under all
circumstances, abuse the right to initially hold the gun.
We believe that this view grossly misinterprets the realities of the collective
bargaining process. Unions, while likely to behave opportunistically if given a
chance, are ultimately constrained by employers' ability to financially survive in
their respective markets. Even if the allocation of initial entitlements allows
unions to behave opportunistically, and even if none of the possible legal
constraints operate to control or eliminate such behavior on their part, unions

note 1, at 391-93 (discussing the implications of two-tier wage structures on the duty of fair
representation).
115 See FLANAGAN Er AL., supra note 103, at 507.
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will be constrained by forces in the product market.1 16 Within the ILMs context
such a constraint becomes much more relevant, given that those employees that
have made firm-specific investments are very much dependent on117 the
employer's survival as a necessary condition to recover their investments.
On the other hand, employers are in a very different position with respect
to their ability to behave opportunistically and the potential benefits of such
behavior. By behaving opportunistically, employers are not only able to extract
immediate rents due to employees, but are also able to potentially eliminate
given unions. Within the striker replacement context, an employer's
opportunistic behavior is manifested when an employer forces a strike at a time
when most employees have made investments in firm-specific skills. 118 Under
current law, the employer can then permanently (not just temporarily) replace
these economic strikers. 119 Once the replacements are in place, it is very likely
that the union will cease to exist (via decertification), or that it will no longer
exercise any real representational function vis-a-vis management. 120 In short,
while both employers and unions can potentially engage in opportunistic
behavior, it seems that particularly within the striker replacement context
employers have a much broader set of options in exercising the power derived
from such behavior. Given these dynamics, it appears that among the two
parties involved, while employers will be unlikely to ever negotiate away the
right to hire permanent replacements (i.e., if I want to shoot and kill Union, I
certainly need a gun), unions might be more inclined to do so because killing
Employer is no good.
IV. LET'S CALL IT A DRAW
The debate generated by our initial article and Professor Corbett's pointed
response is illustrative, we believe, of a fundamental characteristic of the
broader debate on the issue of striker replacements: there is hardly any middle
ground for compromise. In our original article, we provided what we thought
was a balanced and sound approach to the striker replacement dispute. While
unions will be given the initial entitlement against the use of striker
replacements, they will be closely monitored against the opportunistic use of

116

See Kochan & Katz, supra note 101, at 56-59.
See Schwab, supra note 22, at 24-28.
118 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 1, at 379.
117
119

See supranotes 7-13 and accompanying text.
See Cynthia L. Gramm, Empirical Evidence on Political Arguments Relating to
Replacement Worker Legislation, 1991 LAB. L.J. 491, 493 (finding that unions are less likely
to survive following the use of permanent replacements by the employer).
120
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such a right by means of the duty to bargain in good faith. 121 Given what we
believed to be the realities of the industrial relations process, unions, we
argued, would be more likely to negotiate away the right against striker
replacements. Under such conditions, the parties will reach their own "best"
solution.
In reading Professor Corbett's response, however, one would be lead to
believe that our initial proposal was absolutely one-sided, that it was
unresponsive to management concerns, and that we were unwilling to recognize
that unions, like employers, can and do engage in opportunistic behavior. His
reply takes an absolute, "no way" response to our proposal, thus leaving very
little room for some sort of "negotiated" solution.
Perhaps this contentious area of labor law is one in which there is no room
for compromise. A proposal that allows management to hire permanent
replacements will not be able, at the same time, to prevent employers from
behaving opportunistically, while a proposal that protects unions against the use
of permanent replacements will fail in protecting employers against union
abuses. However, we continue to be somewhat more optimistic about the
prospect of a negotiated solution within the context of our proposal. While
academics have failed to reach an agreement on the matter, perhaps those in the
trenches will show us the way-if we just give them a chance.

121 See 29

U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
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